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A businessman turned minister: 
what is Avakov’s background?
Avakov is a typical representative of his generation, 
an individual who started his business career in 
the perestroika period and then made a smooth 
transition to politics in a newly created state. 
A similar situation was found with other Ukrain-
ian politicians who are more popular than Avakov, 
including Yulia Tymoshenko, Serhiy Tihipko and 
Petro Poroshenko. The future minister was born 
in 1964 in Baku, to an Armenian family who set-
tled in Ukraine two years later. He has a degree 
in engineering. In 1990, he established his first 
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The change of government in Ukraine in 2019 has boosted the political position of Arsen Avakov, the 
longest-serving interior minister in the history of independent Ukraine (he has been in five consecu-
tive governments since February 2014). He was the only member of Volodymyr Hroysman’s cabinet 
to remain in office following Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s presidential victory. Zelenskiy came to power 
demanding that the political class should be renewed and the ‘old politicians’ removed, among other 
things. According to some Ukrainian politicians and media outlets, Avakov is an essential and highly 
influential politician, a guarantor of internal stability and a possible candidate for prime minister. Over 
the last six years, the interior minister has built up a strong position for himself in the internal security 
sector (for example, he supervises the National Police and the National Guard) and has successfully 
neutralised attempts by other politicians to limit his power. Moreover, any talk of his dismissal is 
frequently viewed as a threat to the country’s stability. Avakov has a big media presence and posi-
tions himself as an experienced official, a statesman and a guardian of justice and order above the 
divisions that run along party lines. While maintaining control of the Interior Ministry agencies, he 
has become politically independent and has built up an exceptionally strong position for himself. 
However, it seems that his media image as an omnipotent and increasingly influential politician does 
not correspond completely to his actual status. His attempts so far to extend his influence beyond 
the Interior Ministry (in politics in general, as well as in numerous institutions of the judiciary) have 
had less impressive results than he had expected. Alongside this, Avakov is among Ukraine’s least 
popular politicians; he has no political party base, no sufficient funds and no media assets that could 
enable him to have any effective influence on the work of the government and parliament.
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company, Investor, which was involved in buying 
up certificates of companies undergoing privati-
sation. Two years later, in Kharkiv he established 
the Bazys bank; this provided banking services 
to Investor, which had by then been transformed 
into a holding company including businesses ac-
tive on the property market, in the energy sector 
and in the food industry. Although it was one 
of the major local companies in Kharkiv and the 
Kharkiv region, it could not compare with the 
biggest business groups formed by Ukrainian 
oligarchs. Avakov has repeatedly featured on the 
list of Ukraine’s richest people, although his assets 
have gradually been decreasing. In the ranking 
compiled by the Focus weekly in 2008, he placed 
76th, and his assets were worth US$385 million. 
The last time he featured in this ranking was in 
2018. His assets were estimated at US$52 million, 
which ranked him 90th.1 In its ranking, the Focus 
weekly listed Hravelit-21, a company involved 
in selling natural gas extracted by Energia-95, 
as Avakov’s main asset.
His intention to develop and protect his business 
undertakings led Avakov to get more actively in-
volved in politics. In 2002, he was appointed mem-
ber of an executive committee on the Kharkiv city 
council; ahead of the 2004 presidential election 
he sided with Viktor Yushchenko, and following 
Yushchenko’s victory he was appointed governor 
of the Kharkiv region. In the 2010 presidential cam-
paign, he supported Yulia Tymoshenko, a rival of 
Viktor Yanukovych, who won the election. In 2011, 
Avakov had to emigrate to Italy due to his conflict 
with the Party of Regions (the ruling party at that 
time), and more specifically with this party’s increas-
ingly influential politician Hennadiy Kernes (the 
mayor of Kharkiv after 2010). As a consequence, 
Avakov was forced to sell a portion of his assets 
(including the Energia-95 company), while his other 
assets were effectively confiscated from him, in-
1 Е. Шаповал,  ‘Кто самый богатый в Украине. Рейтинг 
ТОП-100 Нового Времени’, HB Бизнес, 25 October 2018, 
www.nv.ua/biz.html.
cluding Bazys bank, which at that time provided 
banking services to Turboatom (a major industrial 
company), and was closed by the state regulator.
In 2012, Avakov was elected as a deputy to the 
Verkhovna Rada (VR, the Ukrainian lower house of 
parliament) on Batkivshchyna party list, and was 
granted parliamentary immunity, which enabled 
him to return to Ukraine. He took part in the Euro-
maidan protests, during which he was responsible 
for infrastructure and provisions. Following Yanu-
kovych’s escape from Ukraine in February 2014, 
he was appointed interior minister. In the same 
year, he left Batkivshchyna and became one of 
the founders of the People’s Front, which formed 
a coalition with the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and 
ruled the country from 2014 to 2019.
Within his first two years in office as interior 
minister, Avakov allegedly managed to recover his 
former assets.2 The size of those assets is difficult 
to estimate because some of them registered as 
belonging to his family members and business 
partners. According to the former deputy Serhiy 
Leshchenko, Avakov’s wife owns a solar power 
station which generates a revenue of around 
50 million hryvnias (around US$2 million) annual-
ly.3 Avakov’s major business partner of many years 
is Ihor Kotvitskyi (his former driver and People’s 
Front deputy), which prompts the assumption that 
he too controls a portion of the assets belong-
ing to the interior minister. 2015 saw a scandal 
involving Kotvitskyi siphoning off US$40 million 
to a bank account in Panama. However, an investi-
gation launched into this matter was discontinued 
(for reasons including actions carried out by the 
Interior Ministry). It is also likely that Avakov is 
earning undisclosed income from bid-rigging in 
tenders organised by the Interior Ministry, and 
also from protection offered to illegal businesses, 
mainly those involved in gambling. However, the 
size of this income is difficult to estimate.4 Regard-
2 И. Верстюк, ‘Внутренние дела министра. Как расцвел 
бизнес главы МВД Арсена Авакова при новой власти — 
расследование’, НВ, 23 October 2016, www.nv.ua.
3 С. Лещенко, ‘Сговор олигархов! Украинцы спасают почти 
банкрота Ахметова’, 4 May 2020, www.youtube.com.
4 ‘Нелегальные игорные бизнесмены снова подняли 
головы’, Цензор.НЕТ, 7 May 2020, www.censor.net.ua.
Avakov is a typical example of an in-
dividual who made a smooth transi-
tion from business to politics.
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less of the doubts as to how big the assets owned 
by the minister and his family members really are, 
by Ukrainian standards Avakov can at best be 
categorised as a regional oligarch. It is therefore 
unlikely that it is his own financial assets, rather 
than his role in the government, that enable him 
to play an important part in Ukrainian politics.
Avakov’s place on the Ukrainian 
political scene
At present, Avakov’s position reflects the con-
fidence placed in him by Zelenskiy, who views 
Avakov as one of the most effective ministers in 
the Ukrainian government.5 It was the president 
rather than the prime minister who decided that 
Avakov should remain in office, not only in the 
government headed by Oleksiy Honcharuk (August 
2019 – March 2020) but also in the current cabinet 
under Denys Shmyhal (formed in March 2020). 
This happened regardless of the president’s initial 
statements which suggested that Avakov should 
continue his job as interior minister, but only tem-
porarily. Avakov won favour with Zelenskiy back 
in 2019 during the presidential campaign, when 
he declared his readiness to act to ensure a fair 
election procedure and publicly spoke out against 
Poroshenko, Zelenskiy’s main rival. Although Ava-
kov had been in conflict with Poroshenko over 
the supervision of the internal security agencies, 
it cannot be ruled out that he had agreed on his 
stance with Zelenskiy’s campaign team, resulting 
in Avakov remaining in office as interior minister 
following the presidential election. In the post-
election period, the interior minister was one of 
several major figures (alongside Andriy Bohdan, 
the former head of the President’s Office) who 
introduced the new president to how Ukrainian 
politics and the state administration operate. Ava-
kov managed to win favour with the president’s 
close collaborator Serhiy Shefir (who is also a co- 
-founder and co-owner of Studio Kvartal 95, the 
base of Zelenskiy’s acting and producing career 
before he became president). Avakov is said to still 
be on friendly terms with Shefir.
5 ‘Зеленский назвал Авакова одним из самых эффективных 
чиновников’, Українська правда, 3 March 2020, 
www.pravda.com.ua.
Avakov knows how to win people over and is 
capable of forming ad hoc political alliances, al-
though his relationships with key figures on the 
Ukrainian political scene are difficult to define. Lit-
tle is known about his contacts with the oligarchs 
Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk. With regard 
to Ihor Kolomoyskiy, according to media reports6 
Avakov has consulted some of his political steps 
with him, although there is no evidence to prove 
that their cooperation is permanent. When vot-
ing on issues of key importance for the country’s 
leadership, the deputies associated with Avakov 
rarely vote in concert with those of Kolomoyskiy, 
e.g. against the solutions proposed by the gov-
ernment. The interior minister has influence on 
several deputies, mainly from the Trust and the 
For the Future parliamentary groups composed 
of deputies elected in single-member constituen-
cies, as well as on several Servant of the People 
deputies (including Denys Monastyrskiy, the head 
of the parliament’s Committee on Law Enforce-
ment). However, these deputies do not form a solid 
group which could vote in unison on each major 
issue. It seems that Avakov also maintains his high 
potential for cooperation with the Batkivshchyna 
party and its leader Yulia Tymoshenko, which 
results from the fact that he had been a member 
of this party at the beginning of the last decade, 
and likely also one of its sponsors.
Avakov continues to be in conflict with Kharkiv’s 
political and business elite, mainly with Hennadiy 
Kernes. He has also criticised the pro-Russian op-
position focused around the ‘For Life’ Opposition 
Platform, which results both from his conflict with 
the mayor of Kharkiv and from his likely political 
views: throughout his career he has been associ-
ated with camps that have supported (or at least 
declared their support for) Ukraine’s pro-Western 
orientation. Nevertheless, it should be assumed 
that the interior minister is using his position 
6 ‘«Говорили про життя»: Коломойський про свої візити 
до Авакова, які зафіксували «Схеми»’, Радіо Свобода, 
8 November 2019, www.radiosvoboda.org.
Avakov’s position reflects the con-
fidence placed in him by President 
Zelenskiy.
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to maintain favourable relations with most of 
Ukraine’s oligarchs and major politicians (exclud-
ing Poroshenko). He likely views these relations 
as a promising investment, and does not want 
to identify with any of these people separately.
The pillar of law enforcement
The key source of Avakov’s political position is 
the power he consolidated in his hands when he 
was appointed interior minister. He supervises 
the system of institutions responsible for law 
enforcement, and has the final word in determin-
ing the tasks of the National Police, the National 
Guard, the State Border Service, the State Service 
for Emergency Situations and the State Migra-
tion Service (which employ a total of more than 
200,000 armed officers and civilian employees). 
Moreover, Avakov was the author of the reform 
to the traffic police, modelled on a similar Geor-
gian reform and carried out under pressure from 
the West. The reform resulted in the establish-
ment of a new, well-equipped Patrol Police with 
considerably younger personnel. Corruption in the 
Interior Ministry agencies has also been curbed. 
The creation in 2014 of a new service, the National 
Guard (60,000 soldiers), modelled on the struc-
tures of the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops, 
was another success. The Guard’s establishment 
enabled the government to deal with the situ-
ation concerning the proliferation of volunteer 
armed groups formed on an ad hoc basis when 
the conflict with Russia broke out. Most of these 
groups were incorporated into the Armed Forces 
of Ukraine; four groups were incorporated into 
the National Guard and their volunteer status 
was maintained.
The Azov regiment, which for example fought in 
the battles of Ilovaysk and Mariupol, is one of the 
groups which are said to be heavily influenced 
by Avakov. The incorporation of this regiment 
into the National Guard gave Avakov a tool to put 
pressure on Andriy Biletskiy, the regiment’s former 
commander turned politician, and the leader of the 
nationalist party known as the National Corps and 
of the so-called Azov movement. The movement 
includes well-trained fighter groups known as 
National Teams whose activity is said to be influ-
enced by the interior minister and, in some situ-
ations, coordinated with the ministry’s agencies.7
The Interior Ministry has also been involved in sup-
porting organisations grouping veterans of anti-
terror operations carried out in eastern Ukraine 
(ATO). This support enables Avakov to maintain 
his influence in these groups, which have been 
unfavourable towards successive presidents and 
governments. This makes it increasingly likely that 
the Interior Ministry under Avakov is involved in 
forming various ‘grassroots’ units to maintain 
public order, such as the National Teams, as well 
as the ‘municipal militias’ which are often com-
posed of local demobilised participants in fighting 
in eastern Ukraine. These structures are typical of 
the Ukrainian public security system because they 
have the status of units supervised by the authori-
ties of a specific city and are funded by that city. 
Nevertheless, they are required to obtain a licence 
authorising them to offer security and public or-
der services. This licence is issued by the Interior 
Ministry. The funding, or at least the toleration 
of groups involved in the ‘display of force’, which 
operate outside of the Interior Ministry structures, 
is a potential boost to Avakov’s informal position, 
and helps him build favourable relations with 
regional governors and mayors of big cities.
Avakov’s attempts to expand his power
The only institutions in the law enforcement sys-
tem that could threaten Avakov’s political posi-
tion are the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and 
the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine 
(NABU). Avakov’s numerous actions and state-
ments lead to the conclusion that he is trying 
to influence the procedures for personnel selection 
applied by these institutions. His activity in this 
7 Both Biletskiy and Avakov officially deny that they are 
working together; however, there seems to be a consensus 
among Ukrainian political scientists and journalists that 
Avakov does have influence over Biletskiy and the Azov 
movement.
Avakov’s position has been boosted 
by his supervision of the law en-
forcement institutions.
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field is a major reason for the delay to the end of 
the SBU’s reform programme. One of the main as-
sumptions of this reform is that the Service should 
be stripped of its powers to carry out economic 
crime investigations and combat organised crime. 
These powers are to be taken over by the Financial 
Investigation Service (SDF) and the Interior Min-
istry respectively. If this reform is implemented, 
it will increase Avakov’s importance, especially if 
he is allowed to install his own people in the SDF 
and to seize control of the measures to combat 
organised crime. The appointment of Vladislav 
Bukhariev as Avakov’s advisor is one signal that 
Avakov is forming an economic crime investiga-
tion team. Bukhariev is a former deputy head of 
the SBU, and was responsible for the Service’s 
economic crime investigation department. Accord-
ing to unofficial reports, Bukhariev was dismissed 
from the SBU in the aftermath of a violent conflict 
with the SBU’s head Ivan Bakanov, resulting from 
Avakov boycotting Bakanov’s orders.
Avakov is said to have initiated an investigation 
into an economic offence committed by Artem 
Sytnyk, the head of NABU, who had been seen 
as a public servant with an untarnished reputa-
tion. The investigation is focused on whether 
Sytnyk accepted a bribe from a businessman he 
knew, involving the latter paying for Sytnyk to stay 
in a leisure centre for six days (costing around 
US$1000). This incident undermined Sytnyk’s cred-
ibility, although he only received an administrative 
penalty. The Sytnyk case is likely an act of personal 
revenge because it was NABU that carried out 
an investigation into irregularities surrounding 
the procurement of backpacks for the National 
Guard, in which Avakov’s son was suspected. 
Deputies associated with Avakov and Kolomoys-
kiy demanded that Sytnyk should be dismissed. 
Parliament has drafted amendments to the law on 
NABU, which – once passed – will make it possible 
to dismiss the institution’s head for committing 
a financial offence as well (and not only for a fi-
nancial offence). The draft law has come under 
criticism from the International Monetary Fund 
(at present Kyiv is negotiating a financial support 
agreement worth around US$5 billion with the 
IMF) and ambassadors from the G7. Alongside 
this, despite Avakov’s failure to extend his influ-
ence to NABU and the SBU, there are indications 
that he has managed to find an ally in the Office 
of the Prosecutor General. According to informa-
tion obtained by investigative journalists, Avakov 
is likely to wield informal influence on decisions 
taken by the Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova, 
whose brother was involved in Avakov’s business 
undertakings in 2008–2016, and whose husband 
is an Interior Ministry employee.8
Since Zelenskiy was elected president, his team 
has made two attempts to weaken Avakov’s po-
sition. This can be viewed as a signal to Avakov 
suggesting that his position within the system of 
power should not be boosted any further. Indeed, 
it may even be reduced. The first attempt involved 
the president assuming control of the National 
Guard, which had been supervised by the Interior 
Ministry. The other attempt involved surrounding 
the minister with deputies who were expected 
to take over some of his responsibilities. Both of 
these attempts failed; however, they forced Ava-
kov to focus on maintaining control of his ministry.
Avakov’s political prospects
Avakov’s political position is without precedent in 
Ukrainian politics. Never before has a high-ranking 
official, who was appointed rather than elected, 
filled a key office in the state administration for so 
long. At the same time, Avakov has several serious 
weaknesses. His major weakness is his modest 
power base. The People’s Front, which in 2014 
put forward his candidacy for interior minister, is 
now effectively non-existent. Although Avakov has 
influence on several MPs in parliament, they come 
from various parliamentary groups and do not 
form a solid group. Another important factor 
8 О.  Чорновалов, ‘Ірина Венедіктова: білі плями 
в декларації та неафішовані бізнес-зв’язки родини нової 
генпрокурорки (розслідування)’, Радіо Свобода, 23 April 
2020, www.radiosvoboda.org.
The interior minister intends to ex-
ert influence on the procedures for 
personnel selection applied by other 
law enforcement bodies.
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preventing Avakov from increasing his political 
significance is his lack of popularity. According 
to polls, at least 73% of Ukrainians dislike him9 
(the only politicians with an even higher level of 
distrust expressed by the respondents are Viktor 
Medvedchuk and Petro Poroshenko). This is mainly 
due to Avakov’s involvement in corruption scan-
dals (the so-called Avakov backpacks) and the lack 
of progress in investigations into the shocking 
killing of activist Kateryna Handziuk (in 2018) and 
journalist Pavel Sheremet (in 2016).
It seems that Avakov’s status as a highly influential 
figure has been determined not so much by the 
fact that he has major private assets at his disposal 
as by the position he holds in the current political 
configuration. His phenomenon results from his 
ability to adjust to changing government line- 
-ups and to demonstrate to them that he is indis-
pensable and irreplaceable. During Poroshenko’s 
presidency (2014–19), Avakov entered top-level 
politics as a minister put forward by a party which 
was the presidential party’s coalition partner. Over 
the five years during which this coalition was in 
place, he gained a sufficiently strong position 
to be able to hold onto his office following Zelen-
skiy’s rise to power. Zelenskiy likely took the deci-
sion to retain him because of the former conflict 
9 ‘Оцінка громадянами діяльності влади, рівень довіри 
до соціальних інститутів та політиків, електоральні 
орієнтації громадян (лютий 2020р.)’, Разумков Центр, 
24 February 2020, www.rozumkov.org.ua.
between Avakov and Poroshenko over influence 
in the Ukrainian law enforcement sector.
Avakov’s actions confirm that he not only intends 
to maintain his strong position for as long as pos-
sible, but that he also wishes to increase his power, 
albeit informally. His ambitions are reflected in his 
statements regarding the need to declare a state 
of emergency in Ukraine due to the development 
of the COVID-19 epidemic. This would help to bol-
ster his influence on how the state is governed and 
on the local authorities. Moreover, Avakov initiated 
a series of actions which exceeded the powers of 
the Interior Ministry. These included the so-called 
‘small steps’ plan to recover the Donbas proposed 
in 2018, as well as an action plan devised in March 
2020 with the aim of preventing an economic crisis 
and combating the consequences of COVID-19. Nei-
ther of these proposals was accepted, and Avakov 
did not have sufficiently strong political, media or 
financial instruments to push them through and 
further increase his influence. Nevertheless, Avakov 
continues to be a politician with an above-average 
level of independence in government. His control over 
the Interior Ministry, which is crucial for the state’s 
security, forms the basis for this independence. How-
ever, at present there is no desire in the President’s 
Office to let him increase his influence any further.
